Third Circuit Finds Fair Housing Act Claims Survive Death of a Party
On March 31, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined, as a matter of first impression, whether a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) claim survives the death of a party. The Third Circuit held that federal common law governs the survival of claims under the FHA, and that such claims survive the death of a party.
Appellants in Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association were two residents of a condominium association located in the Virgin Islands (the “Association”) who suffered from disabilities, for which each was prescribed an emotional support animal. Each resident obtained a dog. This violated the Association’s “no dogs” rule, which had no exceptions. The rule was enforced by the Association’s Board of Directors (the “Board”). Both residents attempted to request accommodations by filing paperwork with the Association’s office manager, including a doctor’s letter prescribing an emotional support animal, and a dog certification. The Association took no action, and it was disputed as to whether the Board reviewed the requests. The dogs’ presence, however, upset certain residents, two of whom blogged about their opposition to the dogs’ presence, insinuating, among other things, that the dogs’ owners should find someplace else to live and be fined. The Board president subsequently notified the dogs’ owners that they were in violation of the “no dogs” rule and subject to a fine of $50 per day. In March 2012, however, the Board president was succeeded by a new president, who granted the accommodation requests and waived the accrued fines.
Nevertheless, the dog owners filed civil rights cases under the FHA in the District Court of the Virgin Islands against the Association, former Board president, and the two blogging residents. Specifically, each dog owner raised two federal FHA claims: (1) that the Association denied their reasonable requests for accommodation of their disabilities in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); and (2) that the Association, former Board president, and the two blogging residents interfered with the exercise of their fair housing rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The dog owners also asserted supplemental territorial law claims against all appellees.
During the pendency of the litigation, one of the blogging residents and the former Board president died. One of the dog owners also committed suicide, and her claims were dismissed due to her death. The other dog owner’s claims were dismissed on the merits. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the territorial claims in both cases because no federal claims remained.
The Third Circuit, in holding that the claims were dismissed in error, found that the district court incorrectly applied a limited federal gap-filler statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a), to the dog owners’ FHA claims. This error, in turn, led the district court to apply territorial law (in this case, a Virgin Islands statute) as the gap-filler, under which it held that the claims did not survive the death of a party. The Third Circuit explained that because the FHA is not subject to the gap-filler statute, the district court was required to turn to other areas of federal law to determine the survival issue. In this regard, the Third Circuit reasoned that the issue, absent statutory guidance under the FHA regarding survival, must be resolved according to federal common law. The Third Circuit determined that one area where courts consistently apply a uniform rule of federal common law is survival of a federal claim.
Applying the uniform rule, under which remedial claims survive the death of a party, the Third Circuit concluded that the claims brought under the FHA were remedial and, therefore, survived the death of a party. The Third Circuit also found genuine disputes of material fact, ultimately reversing in part and vacating in part the district court’s judgment. The Third Circuit (1) reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Association on both the FHA reasonable accommodation and interference claims; (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the blogging residents on the interference claims; and (3) vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board president. On remand, the Third Circuit ordered the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether to permit substitution for the deceased blogging resident and former Board president. Finally, the Third Circuit reinstated the territorial claims against all appellees.
The Third Circuit’s March 31, 2017 opinion can be viewed here: http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/144776p.pdf.
